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Economic behavior of fishers under climate-related uncertainty: results from field 1 
experiments in Mexico and Colombia  2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
This paper presents the results of economic experiments run among fishermen from the Mexican 5 
and Colombian Pacific. The experimental design aims at studying behavior under uncertainty 6 
concerning the possible effects of climate change on fisheries. We find that subjects’ risk-aversion 7 
diminishes the level of catches and changes fishing practices (e.g. adopting marine reserves), 8 
provided that fishermen have ex ante information on possible climatic consequences. 9 
Furthermore, social preferences (e.g. for cooperation and reciprocity) also play an important role 10 
regarding extraction from common-pool resources. Other factors, such as income, gender and 11 
religion are also found to have some influence. These results have important implications for 12 
adaptation actions and the management of coastal fisheries. 13 
 14 
1. Introduction 15 
The livelihoods and regional development of millions of people in developing countries depend 16 
to a large extent on the fishing sector. For example, several Asian and Latin American countries 17 
are among the major fishing nations in the world and their populations receive up to 20% of 18 
their protein intake from fish products (FAO, 2012). Furthermore fisheries and aquaculture 19 
assure the livelihoods of 10-12 percent of the world's population (FAO, 2014). Nevertheless, 20 
although global fish catch has stabilized during the last decades, fish stocks have been depleted 21 
in a number of regions worldwide (Worm et al., 2006). A direct consequence of this situation is 22 
the risk on food security in a number of regions in the developing world (Smith et al., 2011; 23 
Srinivasan et al., 2010).  24 
 25 
A changing climate is an additional factor of risk for a number of fisheries, especially for 26 
livelihoods in poorer regions (Badjeck et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is well acknowledged that 27 
the vulnerability of fishing livelihoods toward climate change impacts will be enhanced by poor 28 
fishery management (Brander, 2007; Allison et al., 2009; McIlgorm et al., 2010). 29 
 30 
Thus, understanding stakeholders’ decisions under these risky scenarios is of paramount 31 
importance for adaptation to climate change (Gowdy, 2008). Experimental economics provides 32 
*Manuscript including abstract
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a powerful tool for analyzing stakeholders behavior when dealing with common-pool resources 33 
(Cardenas and Ostrom, 2004) and with risky and uncertain situations in general (Sabater-34 
Grande and Georgantzis, 2002; McAllister et al., 2011; Hasson et al., 2012).  35 
 36 
Decisions in fisheries, such as the level of harvesting, or whether or not to comply with 37 
regulations, depend on a number of factors, chiefly fishermen’s preferences. Among the 38 
preferences which are relevant in fishing decisions, fishermen’s attitudes toward risks entailed in 39 
climate hazards play a major role in their actual behavior(Smith & Wilen 2005; Eggert & Lokina 40 
2007; Nguyen & Leung 2009; Brick et al. 2011).Furthermore, fisheries, is a typical common-pool 41 
resource extraction activity. In such a context, fishers face the dilemma of individual against 42 
collective benefits. Experimental economics has proven to be a useful tool to analyze decision-43 
makers’ risk attitudes and other-regarding preferences in the laboratory or in the field. Then, 44 
attitudes elicited in an experiment reflect home-grown values which have been developed during 45 
a subject’s social or professional interaction experiences. Therefore, experimental methods can 46 
be used to capture attitudes and preferences which both affect and are affected by the subject’s 47 
real world activity. In this sense, the experiments with populations of fishermen will capture how 48 
this specific subject pool will behave in a simulated context resembling their real-life decision-49 
making environment and, consequently, real-world fishery management (Moreno-Sanchez & 50 
Maldonado 2009; Revollo & Ibarra 2014; Revollo et al. 2016). 51 
 52 
In spite of the regional importance of the fisheries sector in Latin America (Thorpe and Bennett, 53 
2001), few studies in Latin America have used experimental economics for analyzing fishers’ 54 
behavior in controlled economic environments (for more detail see Table I). Even fewer 55 
experimental studies have been carried out on adaptation to climate change (e.g. Hasson et al., 56 
2010; Hasson et al., 2012). In the case of Latin America, Bernal et al. (2013) analyzed the 57 
adaptation strategies of farmers when confronted to water scarcity due to climate change. 58 
Although game theory has been used for studying fisheries and climate change (Bailey et al., 59 
2010), as far as we know, no studies have been published on fisheries’ adaptation to climate 60 
change using experimental methodology. The aim of this paper is to report results from field 61 
experiments on behavior toward climate change among fishermen. We present two studies in 62 
Latin America: one deals with the artisanal fisheries of Tribugá Gulf, Colombia; and the other 63 
deals with the abalone fishery, off Baja Peninsula, Mexico. We present both cases in detail in 64 
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the next two sections. In both experiments, real monetary rewards were used to incentivize 65 
the decisions made by subjects in a controlled economic environment. In both experiments, 66 
the decision-making context involves extraction decisions from a common-pool resource under 67 
scenarios of external environmental change, framed as a risk affecting the returns of the 68 
extraction process. This paper is divided into five sections: the introduction is followed by 69 
materials and methods, results, discussion, and conclusions. 70 
 71 
Table I. Summary of field experiments with fisheries in Latin America 72 
 73 
2. Methods 74 
2.1. Local context and study areas 75 
2.1.1. The abalone fishery off Natividad Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 76 
The abalone fishery off Baja, is one of the most valued fisheries in Mexico (25th place). In 2012, 77 
the value of a ton was almost 13,000 USD (CONAPESCA, 2012). While abalone in Mexico is 78 
mostly an export commodity, it indirectly contributes to domestic welfare and food security, 79 
since earned money is used to buy local food. It is exploited by 22 fishing cooperatives and 80 
generates about 20,000 jobs (both direct and indirect). Abalone catches have diminished to 81 
about 10% of the average volume harvested during the 1950s (Revollo and Saenz-Arroyo, 2012). 82 
Possible explanations for this sharp decrease are: over-exploitation, environmental changes, 83 
illegal harvesting, or a combination of these. The fact is that global climatic change is expected 84 
to have more impact on vulnerable fisheries. Indeed, ocean acidification will directly affect 85 
species with calcium carbonate skeletons (Perry, 2011), such as abalone. Furthermore, there is 86 
evidence that an increasing temperature and decreasing dissolved oxygen (i.e. hypoxia) in 87 
coastal ecosystems, due to carbon dioxide absorbed by marine waters (Roessig et al., 2004), 88 
provokes  higher mortality rates in marine invertebrates such as abalones (e.g. Guzman del Proo 89 
et al., 2003). 90 
 91 
We present the case of the fishing cooperative that operates in Natividad Island 92 
(27o51´09´´N/115o10´09´´O), located in mid-Baja Peninsula (Figure 1). Both the fishing 93 
cooperative and the NGO Comunidad y Biodiversidad (COBI A.C.) have implemented a pilot 94 
program of marine reserves around Natividad Island (Micheli et al., 2012). Under this context, 95 
we designed a field experiment with the inhabitants of Natividad Island in order to study the 96 
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determinants of their behavior in a harvesting experiment, framed as a common-pool 97 
resource in the presence of a changing climate. 98 
 99 
Figure 1. Natividad Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 100 
 101 
2.1.2. The Tribugá Gulf fishery, Colombia 102 
The Tribugá Gulf is located in the northernmost Colombian Pacific, Province of Chocó 103 
(N5°30’06’’/W77°16’09’’), dominated by a tropical rain forest climate, with 28°C mean 104 
annual temperature (Figure 2). The Tribugá Gulf fishery sector is characterized by artisanal 105 
fisheries that mainly use longlines (hooks) and fishing nets. The target species are snapper, 106 
Pacific sierra, seashells (locally known as “piangua”) and prawns. In this area, artisanal fishing is 107 
the main livelihood for most coastal communities, but in recent years fish stocks have been 108 
declining in both capture volume and catch size. Caicedo et al. (2008) reckon that the increase 109 
in fishing effort, the use of unconventional fishing practices and climate change effects are 110 
among the main causes of this decline. 111 
 112 
In this case, the livelihoods of coastal communities are vulnerable to climate change effects due 113 
to the lack of proper fisheries management, lack of both basic services (electricity, water, 114 
sewage) and social security, as well as geographical isolation from the rest of the country. Such a 115 
situation leads to a poverty trap, as demonstrated by Rebellón (2004), using an adapted version 116 
of the model of Brander and Taylor (1998). It is shown there, that more effort by the families in 117 
the Colombian Pacific generates higher levels of income by over-fishing. Thus, it is interesting to 118 
assess the behavior of fishermen under this vulnerability context, looking at possible 119 
improvements in fishery management in the region. 120 
 121 
Lopez et al. (2004), Cardenas (2008), and Moreno and Maldonado (2009) have analyzed the 122 
behavior of stakeholders in Colombian fisheries by means of experimental economics. We 123 
present  the  results  of  a  fishing-game-under-uncertainty  experiment,  which  is  adapted  from 124 
Ostrom et al. (1994), Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) and Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002), 125 
in order to assess the decision-making of artisanal fishers, under uncertainty caused by 126 
potentially changing climate conditions in the Gulf of Tribugá. 127 
 128 
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Figure 2. Tribugá Gulf, Colombia 129 
 130 
2.2. Experimental design 131 
Due to specific contexts and logistics for each case, we adapted experimental designs for each 132 
site. Thus, econometric methods (see below) somehow differ in both approach and variables. In 133 
spite of these differences, the main objective of this study remains the same in both cases1. We 134 
therefore reckon that results, are nevertheless comparable for drawing valid conclusions. 135 
 136 
2.2.1. Natividad Island, Mexico 137 
Field experiments were carried out at Natividad Island, and included both men and women 138 
older than 16 years. A public invitation was made to the whole population. It was attended by 139 
37 people (N=37, 26 men and 11 women), who represented approximately 15% of the total 140 
adult population in the island with an average monthly income of $630 USD. For the baseline 141 
treatment (BL), all participants played ten rounds. In the first five (rounds 1-5), they had to 142 
decide on catches from one to ten resource units, knowing that their monetary rewards (in 143 
accumulated points converted to real currency at the end of the session) would depend on 144 
individual and group decisions.2 In the setup implemented, Nash equilibrium is achieved by 145 
harvesting ten units of resource, while the social optimum is obtained with one harvested unit 146 
per round. Participants are told that the resource recovery rate was 50% for each round. 147 
 148 
For the second sub-session, (rounds 6-10), participants were told that the recovery rate would 149 
change for the rest of the game and that the change would depend on whether a random 150 
climatic variation (e.g. El Niño Southern Oscillation -ENSO) would be present in that round3. 151 
Besides, they were told to choose between either implementing a marine reserve or not, 152 
                                                          
1 Payoffs tables and experimental protocols were tested in both Mexico and Colombia with pilot experiments. These 
were carried out with both students and fisheries-related colleagues for improving the experimental design before being 
applied in the field. This is a standard guideline in experimental economics which warrants unbiased decision-making 
among players. Please refer to payoffs tables and experimental protocols in the Appendix. 
2 In the Appendix A, we provide details on the experimental economics: decision sheets and the table of scores. 
3 The stochastic component (i.e. treatment on fisheries uncertainty due to climate change effects) was not included in 
the baseline treatment during the first rounds of the experiment (rounds 1-5 in the Mexican experiment) in order to 
have a reference for comparison among treatments. Otherwise, we would not be able to disentangle the effects from 
climate change uncertainty from the “normal” conditions of fishermen’s decision-making.   
 
6 
 
according to the scenarios shown in Table II. This decision to implement or not a marine 153 
reserve is maintained for the remaining rounds and cannot change in subsequent rounds. 154 
The decision is made before starting round six and held until the end. Participants were then 155 
asked to form two groups for the rest of the game: one including those choosing a marine 156 
reserve (N=30) and another including those deciding not to implement the reserve (N=7). The 157 
last five rounds follow the same logic as the first five: participants’ profits depend on both 158 
individual and group extractions. Communication among the participants was forbidden, in all 159 
cases, before, after, or during the harvesting decisions. 160 
  161 
Table II. Scenarios shown to participants in the climatic change / marine reserves at Natividad 162 
Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 163 
 164 
Payoffs were calculated following Cardenas and Ramos (2006), considering that fisheries 165 
resources should be considered as common-pool resources, because usually the individual 166 
interest is in contradiction of the collective interest. Hence, subject i’s earnings in round t are 167 
given by: 168 
 169 
Where: 170 
Xi  is harvesting level of participant i whose values range from one to ten and Price denotes 171 
the price of the common-pool resource. N is the number of participants in each group and 172 
Recovery Rate is the rate at which the remaining fish stock can regenerate at the end of each 173 
harvesting period. This depends on the scenario, as shown on Table II. Max Quantity is the 174 
maximum level of fish stock that is recovered in each round and the sum of all extraction levels, 175 
Xi correspond to the fish stock level actually harvested at the end of each round. 176 
 177 
It  is  worth  noting  that  a  subject’s payoff  increases  in  own  individual  extraction  but 178 
decreases in the total amount harvested, indicating the existence of horizontal externality 179 
among individual decision-makers in the extraction game. In other words, the benefits of each 180 
participant depend on both individual and group extractions (Ostrom et al., 1994). Hence, the 181 
collective benefits are assumed to be the asset value of the natural resource (i.e. the value of a 182 
fish left alive in the sea). 183 
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2.2.2. Tribugá Gulf, Colombia 184 
Before explaining the experimental design applied in the Gulf of Tribugá, Colombia, is important 185 
to note that this design is different from that applied in Natividad Island (Mexico), due to 186 
differences in fisheries management in both areas and the type of fishing practices. Natividad 187 
Island (Mexico), abalone fishing (deep sea fishing) is performed, whose average prices 188 
generated a high level of income for fishermen in the area and therefore there fishing 189 
cooperatives that manage a vigorous productive and industrial infrastructure, including support 190 
research laboratories aquaculture. Instead, in the Gulf of Tribugá (Colombia), shrimp, prawns, 191 
snapper or Sierra (net and hook fishing) is performed, the average price does not allow the 192 
angler to reach the minimum level of monthly income to survive, situation which does not 193 
facilitate fisheries management in the area. 194 
 195 
Field experiments were carried out in Nuquí, Coquí, Panguí, Joví, Arusí, Termales, El Valle, 196 
Jurubirá and Tribugá, coastal communities in the Tribugá Gulf, Province of Chocó, Colombia, 197 
including both men and women older than 16 years. A public invitation was made to the whole 198 
population. It was attended by 160 people (142 men and 18 women), who represented 199 
approximately 8% of the total adult population in the Gulf, with an average monthly income of 200 
$220 USD. We formed groups of five people and all groups were administered the same 201 
experiment with the same treatments. Before starting, an explanation of the game context, its 202 
rules, and monetary retributions were explained to all participants.4 They were told that their 203 
individual earnings (in accumulated point convertible in real currency at the end of the session) 204 
would depend on both their individual and group decisions. 205 
 206 
They made decisions for 20 rounds of which the first ten (rounds 1-10) corresponded to the 207 
baseline treatment. For the last ten rounds (rounds 11-20), participants were informed that the 208 
recovery rate would change for the rest of the session, depending on  the occurrence of a 209 
random climatic variation (e.g. El Niño Southern Oscillation -ENSO). Besides, they were asked to 210 
choose between either implementing a marine reserve or not5. Thus, within each group, each 211 
                                                          
4 In Appendix B, we provide details on the experimental economics: decision sheets and the table of scores. 
5 The stochastic component (i.e. treatment on fisheries uncertainty due to climate change effects) was not included in 
the baseline treatment during the first rounds of the experiment (rounds 1-10 in the Colombian experiment) in order to 
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player must choose, individually and confidentially, whether to play 11-20 rounds under an 212 
insurance (i.e. with a marine reserve) or not (i.e. open-access fishing without marine reserve). 213 
The last 10 rounds follow the same logic of the baseline treatment, and the level of earnings 214 
depends still on both individual and group extractions. Furthermore, two more treatments were 215 
implemented during the experiment: 216 
 217 
a) Communication treatment (n=80): all five participants within each group can communicate for 218 
five minutes before rounds 11-20, so they can share their experiences and learn from rounds 1-219 
10 in order to set up a harvesting strategy for the rest of the game. 220 
 221 
b) Voluntary enforcement treatment (n=80): the monitor explains the negative effects of 222 
overfishing and therefore suggests a minimum level of extraction (one unit) in each round. It is 223 
also noted that harvesting over this recommended level will be enforced. However, 224 
participants can vote on whether each player’s harvesting levels should be inspected in each 225 
round. If the inspection mechanism is voted, participants harvesting above the socially optimal 226 
unit, are fined with minus 100 points for each additional unit extracted from the common pool. 227 
Both the experimental designs and hence, the models, presented differences between both 228 
countries in order to adjust for local and institutional realities.  Thus, the theoretical model for 229 
the economic experiment applied in Colombia is presented as follows. 230 
 231 
Payoffs were calculated following Cárdenas (2010)6, with a model that simulates the social 232 
dilemma of Common Pool Resource (CPR) Hence, the individual harvesting level that maximizes 233 
the private benefit of each participant (xi); in other words, the agent's objective function is 234 
defined by his own effort xi, and aggregate efforts by other agents, ∑xj. Formally, the private 235 
profit Yi of the agent is given by the expression: 236 
Y i axi   12 bxi
2  ne   xj
j1
N 
  237 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
have a reference for comparison among treatments. Otherwise, we would not be able to disentangle the effects from 
climate change uncertainty from the “normal” conditions of fishermen’s decision-making. 
6 The theoretical model implemented is adapted from Cardenas (2010) and extensively described in Georgantzis et al. 
(2013). 
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where, a is the income from each harvested unit,  b is the  decreasing marginal parameter , φ is 238 
the externality cost due to stock depletion and n is the number of players M represents the cost 239 
that each agent i incurs due to the externality emerging from the aggregate extraction by all 240 
other agents. The Nash solution obtained is given by: 241 
 242 
Cárdenas (2010) suggests that a=60, b=5, φ = 20 and that the minimum harvesting quantity = 1. 243 
It follows that in the Nash equilibrium,  244 
 245 
Thus, a player maximizing own profits, and taking others’ individual extraction levels as given, 246 
harvests eight units in each round. For this reason, this model, as suggested Ostrom, Garner and 247 
Walker (1994), shows that this situation will result in a social dilemma associated with over-248 
exploitation of CPR. In order to incorporate the possibility of adopting a marine reserve insurance 249 
against climate change, we follow Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) and Georgantzís et al. 250 
(2009). It is important to note that this is a type of economic experiment, which studies the 251 
behavior of fishers (Tribugá Gulf, Colombia) confronted to risky economic decisions. For this 252 
reason, the experiment implements a design where fishermen can decide whether or not get 253 
assurance7 against unexpected events (e.g. climatic change) that possibly, affects fisheries and 254 
consequently social welfare.  255 
 256 
Following this approach, in rounds 11-20 players are faced with a lottery (q, X) giving a payoff X 257 
with a probability q. The scheme is designed to compensate the risk of obtaining X=0 (with a 258 
probability of 1-q) with a risk premium which is an increasing (linear) function of the probability 259 
of the unfavorable outcome, as implied in:  260 
 261 
 262 
The experiment assumes a continuum of lotteries (c, r), that for the fishing game under 263 
uncertainty is represented by a continuum of Nash Equilibria, compensating riskier options with 264 
an increase in the expected payoff; in other words, if the player decides not to buy the insurance 265 
                                                          
7 The assurance is associated with the meaning of a protected area or marine reserve thanks to the 
application of economic experiments in Colombia, 2015: http://www.eltiempo.com/estilo-de-
vida/ciencia/nueva-area-marina-golfo-de-tribuga-cabo-corrientes/15474539 
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and fishing is adversely affected by climate change, the expected payoff for the player will be low 266 
or even negative. In summary, the experiment shows that fishermen may have negative payments 267 
if their decision was not to get insurance (i.e. a protected marine reserve) in the presence of 268 
unexpected events (i.e. climate variations) that affect fishing. This experimental design is 269 
consistent with the suggestion by Micheli F, Saenz-Arroyo A, Greenley A, Vazquez L, Espinoza 270 
Montes JA, Rossetto M, et al. (2012), who successfully demonstrate that under future scenarios of 271 
frequent and/or persistent disturbance, increasing resilience to climatic impacts through 272 
networks of marine reserves may be the most effective tool that local communities and nations 273 
worldwide have to combat the negative impacts of global climate change on marine ecosystems 274 
and livelihoods. 275 
 276 
3. Results 277 
3.1. Natividad Island, Baja Peninsula, Mexico 278 
In the first stage (baseline treatment) of the experiment, the average catch was 4.6 units of the 279 
resource. In the second stage, where a treatment is applied under climate change uncertainty, 280 
the average catches decrease (3.3 units). Interestingly, when analyzing the evolution of the 281 
average catches before and after the implementation of marine reserves, along with the 282 
presence of the hypoxia phenomenon, it is observed that the level of catches for the whole group 283 
(both with and without reserves), is reduced in about 38%. In contrast, when the experiment 284 
treatment change, the group without marine reserves reduced their harvesting level in 20% (p-285 
value<0.01), while the group with marine reserves reduced catches in 46% (p-value<0.01). Hence, 286 
both groups, after learning the possibility of a climatic event, decided to reduced their average 287 
catch (Figure 3).  288 
 289 
About 75% of participants decided to implement a marine reserve during the second stage of the 290 
experiment. Besides, when asked the percentage that they would devote to creating marine 291 
reserve with or without a scenario of climatic variability (i.e. hypoxia), they responded that a 41-292 
50% of the fishing ground would be converted into marine reserve in the presence of hypoxic 293 
conditions, and 21-30% otherwise. 294 
 295 
Figure 3. Average harvesting levels for the baseline (left panel) and climatic variability (right 296 
panel) treatments (p-value < 0.01). ANOVA to test whether the normality and hetersokedasticity 297 
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assumptions are accepted. It is verified that harvesting levels are significantly different across 298 
treatments.  299 
 300 
3.2. The Tribugá Gulf, Colombia 301 
The results show that the average extraction for 11-20 rounds (control treatments 302 
communication and voluntary-enforcement) in context of climate change uncertainty, are always 303 
lower compared to those obtained in rounds 1-10 (baseline). Particularly, the results show an 304 
average decrease from 4.55 extraction units (baseline treatment) to 3.55 units under the 305 
communication treatment, and an even further decrease to 2.55 units under the voluntary-306 
enforcement treatment (Figure 4) (p-value<0.05).  307 
 308 
The results suggest that the average extraction decisions of fishermen, who participated in the 309 
common-pool resource game, are clearly influenced by the treatments as evidenced by 310 
Cardenas et al. (2002), Cardenas et al. (2003), Cardenas and Ostrom (2004), Cardenas (2010), 311 
Lopez et al. (2009), Maldonado and Moreno (2010), Ostrom et al. (1994), Ostrom (2005) and 312 
Velez et al. (2008).  313 
 314 
In other words, to interpret the behavior of participants during 11-20 rounds, under the 315 
inclusion of treatments (communication and regulation) and the possibility that fishing is 316 
affected by unexpected events, such presence of natural changes (water heating, migration of 317 
species, seasonality of the resource), or defection in commitments set by the community, the 318 
results show that the extraction levels fall.   319 
 320 
Additionally, most participants (152 out of 160) chose to adopt a marine reserve as insurance 321 
against uncertain climatic variation in each round (rounds 11-20).  322 
 323 
Figure 4. Average harvesting levels for the baseline (left panel), communication and voluntary-324 
enforcement (right panel) treatments (p-value < 0.05). ANOVA to test whether the normality and 325 
heterocedasticity assumptions are accepted. It is verified that harvesting levels are significantly 326 
different across treatments.  327 
 328 
 329 
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3.3. Econometric estimation 330 
3.3.1. Natividad Island8 331 
An econometric model was applied for assessing the socioeconomic and social capital 332 
variables that influence decisions on common-pool resources and climatic variability among 333 
islanders at Natividad Island. Table III shows the variables introduced in our model. The model 334 
takes the form: 335 
 336 
 337 
 338 
The dependent variable is harvesting level in the reference period, while all other independent 339 
variables are introduced with a lag, assuming that what is decided in a given period depends on 340 
strategies and feedback from past rounds, except climatic variations. 341 
 342 
Table III. Variables introduced in the econometric model 343 
 344 
Table IV shows the results of the econometric estimation. Among the statistically significant 345 
variables (p<0.1), the ones that measure the harvesting behavior of participant i (CATCHI) and 346 
participant j (CATCHJ) reveal that, for each fish stock unit away from the social optimum in 347 
the previous round, participant i will harvest about 0.53 additional units of the resource stock. 348 
Furthermore, for every unit extracted by other players away from the social optimum, 349 
participant i will harvest 0.48 units in the next round. Another significant variable was GENDER, 350 
indicating that women’s extractions are 0.70 units lower than men’s. Besides, changing 351 
treatment from a baseline to a random climatic event (TREAT) in the following round, leads to 352 
reductions of 0.44 fish stock units under a marine reserve treatment, while this reduction is of 353 
                                                          
8 We applied a balanced panel data model since we had both cross-section information (i.e. harvesting levels of 
participants in each round) and a time series (ten rounds). After comparing the estimates of two panel- data methods 
(fixed and random effects) and with the results of a Hausmman test, we decided to use a random-effects panel-data 
model. We decided to use a random-effects model since it included variables that do not change within individuals, 
but that do change among individuals. Breusch-Pagan, Hausman and F-tests were performed. Besides, auto-correlation 
and heterocedasticity tests were used in order to choose the best model specification (for more detail see: Revollo, 
2012). 
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0.22 without a marine reserve. The possibility of climatic variations (CLIMATE) induced 354 
participants to lower their extraction in 0.24 of resource units. 355 
 356 
Table IV. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions (CATCH) of 357 
participants in the Natividad Island experiment 358 
 359 
3.3.2. Tribugá Gulf, Colombia9 360 
An econometric model was applied for assessing the decision-making of artisanal fishers, under 361 
uncertainty caused by potential climate change conditions in the Gulf of Tribugá. Table V shows 362 
the variables introduced in our model. The model takes the form: 363 
 364 
 365 
 366 
Table V. Variables introduced in the econometric model 367 
 368 
Table VI shows the results of the econometric estimation. So, for the variable EXPERIENCE, it 369 
suggests that more years of fishing experience do not necessarily lead to decreases in the levels 370 
of extraction by the fisher (p-value<0.01). Hence, the average behavior of fishermen 371 
remains invariant to their experience. Furthermore, the negative sign of the SCHOOL variable 372 
indicates that a higher education level implies a greater commitment to sustainable fishing 373 
decisions (p-value<0.01). With respect to income, the result suggests that for every percentage 374 
point increase in the level of income resulting from fishing activities, extraction decisions are 375 
increased by 5.7% (p-value<0.01). AGE was not statistically significant. 376 
 377 
                                                          
9 Like in the empirical evidence of Natividad Island, we applied a balanced panel data model since we had both cross-
section information (i.e. harvesting levels of participants in each round) and a time series (twenty rounds). After 
comparing the estimates of two panel-data methods (fixed and random effects) and with the results of a Hausmman 
test, we decided to use a random-effects panel-data model. We decided to use a random-effects model since it 
included variables that do not change within individuals, but that do change among individuals. Furthermore, 
following the recommendations of Baltagi (2008) and Hsiao (2003), the estimates are correct, as there is no 
autocorrelation, nor hetersokedasticity (for more detail see: Arroyo, 2013).  
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Now, consider the change in the second part of the session with respect to baseline, introducing 378 
uncertainty in the decision-making context and two treatments (communication and 379 
enforcement), this then affects the levels of captures in rounds 11-20. In fact, the fishermen 380 
reduce their levels of catch by 0.08 of common-pool resource units. Particularly, as explained 381 
above, there is a clear effect of communication and enforcement on catch decisions. 382 
 383 
Table VI. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions (CATCH) of 384 
participants in the Tribugá Gulf experiment 385 
 386 
4. Discussion 387 
We provide evidence of behavior in controlled environments by Mexican and Colombian fishing 388 
communities under a scenario of climatic variability. In the case of Mexico, the average 389 
extraction decrease from the baseline treatment to the climate change treatment was 46%; 390 
while in Colombia the decrease ranged between 22% (communication treatment) to 44% 391 
(voluntary-enforcement treatment). These results could be explained under the light of 392 
three types of factors: the subjects’ aversion towards an external risky influence (i.e. climate 393 
change), social preferences (e.g. cooperation and reciprocity), and other demographic elements 394 
(e.g. income, gender and religion). 395 
 396 
4.1. Climate-related risk aversion 397 
When confronted with a treatment where harvesting levels depended on a climatic influence 398 
in the second stage of the experiments, most participants in both countries (95% in Colombia 399 
and about 83% in Mexico) decided to adopt an insurance against climatic risks, in the form of a 400 
marine reserve. Such a scenario implies that fishers would be willing to change fishing practices 401 
in order to secure a less risky flow of future income. These results suggest that information 402 
on climatic variability inhibits common-pool resource over-exploitation. In  this  case,  fishers  403 
would  adopt  sustainable  fishing  practices,  like  lowering their  extractions towards a social 404 
optimum or implementing marine reserves before a climate change scenario, not necessarily 405 
because of pro-environmental preferences, but in order to minimize their expected disutility. 406 
This is a standard result as fishermen frequently are confronted with decision-making in the 407 
presence of uncertainty (Smith and Wilen, 2005; Eggert and Lokina, 2007; Nguyen and Leung, 408 
2009). 409 
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Adaptation to climate variability in fisheries could be helped by information on the risks of 410 
climate change in fishing productivity and therefore in their future livelihoods. Furthermore, 411 
adaptation actions could include the encouragement for implementing marine reserves among 412 
coastal communities. In fact, Micheli et al. (2012) have demonstrated that marine reserves 413 
enhance resilience under climatic variability, acting as an ecological insurance against climate 414 
change. This is important because, to date, no specific actions or programs are aimed at 415 
adapting the Mexican fishery sector to climate change impacts (Ibarra et al., 2013). Similar 416 
situations can be found elsewhere in Latin America, including Colombia. 417 
 418 
Now, as in the experiment, fishermen face certain types of uncertainty for decisions that ignore 419 
other fishermen. For this reason, each participant had to privately decide whether  she  would  420 
overharvest  and  how  many  additional  units  she  would overharvest  as  it happens in usual 421 
fisheries operations (Gelcich et al., 2013). Finally, as pointed out by Gelchich et al. (2013), an 422 
additional source of uncertainty faced by each fisherman, both in the experiment and in the real 423 
world, is due to the horizontal externality emerging from the extraction decisions of other 424 
fishermen. 425 
 426 
4.2. Social preferences 427 
Apart from the subject’s attitude towards the risk of climate change, social preferences are also 428 
important in determining participants’ behavior. Indeed, when managing common-pool 429 
resources, such as fisheries, it is always useful to remind that the willingness to cooperate of one 430 
agent will depend on the behavior of other agents (Keser and Van Winden, 2000). In fact, 431 
Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) point out that the empirical evidence of experimental economics 432 
on common- pool   resources,   show   that   groups   who   can   effectively   communicate   (i.e. 433 
possibility of cooperation), establish a set of social norms, reducing, consequently, over-434 
exploitation. 435 
 436 
In our experiments, we found that participants presented a more sustainable behavior in 437 
common-pool resources extraction after participating in the baseline treatment. This result can 438 
be explained also by a certain degree of cooperation, trust, and reciprocity. According to Fehr 439 
and Leibbrandt (2011), cooperation and low impatience are drivers for such a behavior. 440 
Moreover, social preferences such as altruism and cooperation might enhance productivity 441 
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(Carpenter and Seki, 2011), but in contrast, competition may lead to lower cooperation 442 
(Carpenter and Seki 2006; Stoop et al. 2010). In the experiment carried out in Natividad Island, 443 
the fact that variables CATCHI (difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s 444 
i actual harvest in the previous round. In other words, it measures the willingness to cooperate 445 
of participant i) and CATCHJ ( difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s j 446 
actual harvest in the previous round. It measures the willingness to cooperate of the rest of 447 
participants) were statistically significant, implies that cooperation was an important factor in 448 
determining the harvesting levels. In this way, a participant conditioned her catch to the 449 
harvesting level of the rest of the group. 450 
 451 
Trust and reciprocity were, therefore, other important factors among participants’ behavior. The 452 
importance of trust has been highlighted by McAllister et al. (2011), who found that, under a 453 
risky treatment, trust depended on reciprocity, that is to say, participants reckoned that it was 454 
riskier not to reciprocate among trusting individuals than in a do-nothing treatment. Revollo and 455 
Ibarra (2013) found in a common-pool resource lab experiment among Mexican students, that 456 
players showed a certain degree of reciprocal punishment (i.e. higher harvesting levels) if 457 
they noticed that the rest of the group did not cooperate on resource conservation. In fact, 458 
Kraak (2011) reviewed the evidence that reciprocity is an important factor to fishermen in non-459 
anonymous treatments for more sustainable practices. 460 
 461 
Important considerations for fisheries management can be drawn from our results, given the 462 
fact that  real-world  stakeholders  showed  reciprocity  and  willingness  to  cooperate  (Gowdy,  463 
2008; Venkatachalam, 2008). Indeed, the success of external (i.e. governmental) regulations 464 
depends on the existence of informal rules or local ecological knowledge among stakeholders. 465 
For example, Velez et al. (2008) argue that external regulation should complement existing 466 
informal regulations for fisheries management in Colombia. A similar result was found by Vollan 467 
et al. (2013) for Namibian and South African rural herders. Such results suggest that co-468 
management regimes should be seriously considered for managing common-pool resources, 469 
such as fisheries. Indeed, Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado (2009) found that experiments under 470 
a co-management treatment showed more sustainable harvesting levels in a marine protected 471 
area off Colombia. In fact, co-management could offer effective sustainability results when 472 
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dealing with small-scale fisheries, as demonstrated by Defeo and Castilla (2005) for several Latin 473 
American examples. 474 
 475 
4.3. Other factors 476 
Other factors explaining fisher’s decisions on lowering their harvest after the baseline treatment 477 
were income and religion in the Colombian experiment, and gender in both cases. First, income 478 
is a standard result in experimental economics. Second, in the Tribugá Gulf study, although the 479 
number  of  male  participants  outnumbered  those of  women  (12%)  the  GENDER  variable  480 
was statistically significant. This result was also observed in Natividad Island, with a larger 481 
percent of female participants (29%). Thus, women presented more sustainable catches than 482 
men. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that women are more risk-averse in general (Eckel and 483 
Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and have more sustainable attitudes than men 484 
(Davidson and Black, 2001; Agarwal, 2009; Revollo, 2012). And third, religion was statistically 485 
significant for the Colombian experiment (this variable was not tested in the Mexican 486 
experiment) explaining the decrease in harvesting levels. Few studies have demonstrated the 487 
actual influence of a belief in decision-making towards the environment, but in general, these 488 
show that it does have a positive influence (Chermak and Krause, 2002; Owen and Videras, 489 
2007), although in other public-good experiments this relationship was not evident (Anderson 490 
and Mellor, 2009). 491 
 492 
5. Conclusion 493 
We have studied the behavior of fishermen communities in a controlled experimental harvesting 494 
environment of common-pool resources. The subjects were familiar with the decision-making 495 
problem they faced in the experiment. Thus, their reactions to our treatment factors had 496 
the expected sign. The vast majority would react to climate change through risk-reducing 497 
mechanisms like a marine reserve or any sort of insurance. Also, depending on their social and 498 
educational background, learning from past experience leads them to more sustainable 499 
harvesting levels, avoiding common-pool resource depletion. Climate-related risk-aversion is an 500 
idiosyncratic behavioral reaction to an external factor leading to lower catches or changes in 501 
fishing practices (e.g. adopting marine reserves), provided that fishermen have information in 502 
advance of possible climatic consequences. 503 
 504 
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We suggest that the results from both experiments support the conclusion that the behavior for 505 
sustainable fishing is l i k e l y  t o  b e  achieved, if and only if, control mechanisms are 506 
established to encourage both fisheries management and improvement of life quality to 507 
inhabitants in both studied areas. For example, as suggested by González, G., Díaz, Y. and 508 
Puentes, V. (2015), the work done in Tribugá Gulf-Colombia reveals that regulation of less 509 
selective fishing gear may be a possible alternative in the region, because the tendency is 510 
towards a drastic reduction in fishing. Either way, the Exclusive Zone for Artisanal Fisheries in 511 
the Tribugá Gulf, which is the result of a process of community and government participation, 512 
shows that it is necessary to work on marketing chains for the fishermen for improving their 513 
income and hence their quality of life. Furthermore, social preferences (e.g. cooperation and 514 
reciprocity) also played an important role in determining a more sustainable attitude in 515 
common-pool resources extraction. Other factors, such as income, gender and religion had also 516 
some influence. 517 
 518 
Additionally, it is important to note that in both countries, the results of the experiments were 519 
complemented by a survey that sought to strengthen governance processes of local communities 520 
for the collective construction of sustainable fishery agreements. In case of Colombia and Mexico, 521 
we asked the fishermen if they agreed to implement an area of fisheries reserves, which could be 522 
either an exclusive artisanal fishing zone, a closed area or an area where responsible fishing is 523 
carried out. In other words, the question involves the possibilities for fishermen to establish 524 
agreements for sustainable fisheries.  525 
 526 
Finally, this paper presents empirical evidence on the economic behavior of fishermen and their 527 
behavior on the management of common pool resources, in a context of uncertainty (climate 528 
events). For this reason, the results of economic experiments applied to fishing groups in Mexico 529 
and Colombia, concluded on the importance of the implementation of marine reserves. Thus, this 530 
paper attempts to collaborate and complement the few studies in this field of experimental 531 
economic methods and climatic phenomena that have developed in developing countries, such as 532 
Latin America. 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
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Table I. Summary of field experiments with fisheries in Latin America 
 
Fishery Region of study Main results Reference 
Artisanal fisheries, 
Clam fisheries, and 
Trout fishery 
Caribbean, south 
Pacific, and Andean 
region, all in Colombia 
Cooperation under a 
low regulation penalty, 
and free-riding under a 
high regulation penalty; 
opposition to externally 
imposed regulations 
(Cardenas 2005) 
Artisanal fisheries 
(lobster, conch, 
snapper) and crab 
hunting 
Providence Island, 
Colombia 
Crab hunters were 
more willing to 
cooperate than fishers 
under tax and 
communication 
treatments. 
(Castillo and Saysel 2005) 
Artisanal fisheries Baru Island, Colombia High harvesting rate 
chosen with varying fish 
stock levels. 
(Cardenas et al. 2008) 
Artisanal fisheries Caribbean coast, the 
Pacific coast and the 
Magdalena river (all in 
Colombia). 
External regulation 
should complement 
existing informal 
regulations. 
(Velez et al. 2008) 
Fish or water 
extraction 
Five villages in 
Colombia 
Absence of 
enforcement 
conditioned the 
compliance of a 
regulation on the 
behavior of others. 
(Rodriguez-Sickert et al. 2008) 
Artisanal fisheries Caribbean coast, 
Colombia. 
Experiments under a 
co-management 
treatment showed 
more sustainable 
(Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado 
2009) 
Table I
Fishery Region of study Main results Reference 
harvesting levels in a 
marine protected area. 
Artisanal fisheries Caribbean coast, the 
Pacific coast and the 
Magdalena river (all in 
Colombia). 
Altruism, conformity 
and reciprocity 
featured the harvesting 
decisions of fishers. 
(Velez et al. 2009) 
 
Table II. Scenarios shown to participants in the climatic change / marine reserves at Natividad 
Island, Baja, Mexico 
Game stages SCENARIOS 
First round  
(Baseline R:1-5)  
Recovery rate (RR) = 50% 
(Nº = 37) 
Second round 
(Treatment) 
(R: 6-10) 
Marine reserve implementation  
(Nº = 30) 
No marine reserve implementation  
(Nº = 7) 
Climatic variation No climatic variation Climatic variation No climatic variation 
RR = 40%* RR = 60%* RR = 20%* RR = 80%* 
* The recovery rates were chosen according to the information of Guzmán del Proo et al. (2003) who found 
the changes in recruitment (presumably due to a higher level of hypoxia) for marine invertebrates before 
and after the 1997-1998 ENSO event at Bahia Tortugas, Baja peninsula, Mexico. 
 
Table II
Table III. Variables introduced in the econometric model 
Variable Description Expected sign 
Dependent 
CATCH Harvesting level of participant i in round t+1   
Independent 
CATCHI 
Difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s i actual 
harvest in the previous round.  (+,-) 
It measures the willingness to cooperate of participant i. 
CATCHJ 
Difference between social optimum harvest and the participant’s j actual 
harvest in the previous round.  (+,-) 
It measures the willingness to cooperate of the rest of participants. 
POINTS 
Difference in absolute value between the points of participant i and the rest 
of participants in the previous round. (+,-) 
It measures the inequity aversion. 
CLIMATE 
Dichotomous variable for indicating whether (1) or not (0) a climatic event 
takes place in that round. 
(-) 
TREAT 
Count variable for indicating the type of treatment: 1 for the baseline 
treatment, 2 for no marine reserve implemented, and 3 for marine reserve 
implemented. 
(-) 
GENDER 
Dichotomous variable for indicating gender of participant: 1 for man and 0 
for woman. 
(+) 
FISH 
Dichotomous variable for indicating whether (1) or not (0) the participant is 
actually a fisher in real life. 
(-) 
RESERVE 
Count variable for indicating the percent area that the participant would 
implement as marine reserve: 0-10%=1, 11-20%=2, 21-30%=3, 31-40%=4, 
41-50%=5, 51-60%=6, 61-70%=7, 71-80%=8, 81-90%=9, 91-100%=10. 
(-) 
 
Table III
Table IV. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions (CATCH) of 
participants in the Natividad Island experiment 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. p > |Z|  
CATCHI 0.528 0.078 0.000 * 
CATCHJ 0.481 0.259 0.064 * 
POINTS -0.001 0.001 0.377  
GENDER 0.701 2.03 0.043 * 
TREAT -0.223 0.314 0.077 * 
CLIMATE -0.241 0.446 0.091 * 
RESERVE -0.159 0.126 0.205  
FISH -0.355 0.375 0.344  
CONSTANT 1.917 1.466 0.191  
* p < 0.10     
R-squared = 0.458     
Wald chi2(8) = 146.68 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
N = 333 
    
 
Table IV
 
 
Table V. Variables introduced in the econometric model 
 
Variable                                                                  Description                                                           Expected sign 
 
Dependent 
 
CATCH                    Harvesting level of participant i in round t+1 
 
Independent 
EXPER                    Continuous variable reflecting individual behavior based on years of fishing             (+) 
Categorical variable indicating civil status of participant: 1 for free-union, 2
 
CIVIL 
 
for married, 3 for single, 4 for divorced                                                                             (+,-)
INCOME                 Monthly income from fishing activities                                                                             (+) 
SCHOOL                Continuous variable indicating years of formal education                                              (-) 
Categorical variable indicating religion: 1 for Catholic, 2 for Christian
 
RELIGION 
GENDER 
 
CLIMATE 
Evangelical or Pentecostal, 3 for agnostic                                                                         (+,-) 
Dichotomous variable for indicating gender of participant: 1 for man and 0 
(+) 
for woman. 
 
Dichotomous variable for indicating whether (1) or not (0) a climatic event 
(-) 
takes place in that round
Table V
 
Table VI. Econometric estimations for explaining the individual harvesting decisions 
(CATCH) of participants in the Tribugá Gulf experiment 
                                
                            
 
 Coefficient Std. Err. p > |Z|  
EXPER 0.0041 0.00127 0.074 * 
SCHOOL -0.2382 0.01844 0.000 * 
INCOME 0.0568 0.01589 0.000 * 
AGE 0.0004 0.00131 0.720  
CIVIL 0.1206 0.02366 0.000 * 
RELIGION 0.4195 0.0542 0.000 * 
GENDER 0.4212 0.05390 0.000 * 
CLIMATE -0.07953 0.08907 0.000 * 
* p < 0.10 
R-squared = 0.445 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
N = 1500 
    
 
Table VI
A.1.1. Baseline: Recovery Rate = 50% - Rounds 1-5  
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,593  
   
1,685  
   
1,778  
   
1,870  
   
1,963  
   
2,055  
   
2,148  
   
2,240  
   
2,333  
   
2,425  
1 
   
1,585  
   
1,678  
   
1,770  
   
1,863  
   
1,955  
   
2,048  
   
2,140  
   
2,233  
   
2,325  
   
2,418  
2 
   
1,578  
   
1,670  
   
1,763  
   
1,855  
   
1,948  
   
2,040  
   
2,133  
   
2,225  
   
2,318  
   
2,410  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,218  
   
1,310  
   
1,403  
   
1,495  
   
1,588  
   
1,680  
   
1,773  
   
1,865  
   
1,958  
   
2,050  
51 
   
1,210  
   
1,303  
   
1,395  
   
1,488  
   
1,580  
   
1,673  
   
1,765  
   
1,858  
   
1,950  
   
2,043  
52 
   
1,203  
   
1,295  
   
1,388  
   
1,480  
   
1,573  
   
1,665  
   
1,758  
   
1,850  
   
1,943  
   
2,035  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
843  
      
935  
   
1,028  
   
1,120  
   
1,213  
   
1,305  
   
1,398  
   
1,490  
   
1,583  
   
1,675  
101 
      
835  
      
928  
   
1,020  
   
1,113  
   
1,205  
   
1,298  
   
1,390  
   
1,483  
   
1,575  
   
1,668  
102 
      
828  
      
920  
   
1,013  
   
1,105  
   
1,198  
   
1,290  
   
1,383  
   
1,475  
   
1,568  
   
1,660  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
175  
      
268  
      
360  
      
453  
      
545  
      
638  
      
730  
      
823  
      
915  
   
1,008  
190 
      
168  
      
260  
      
353  
      
445  
      
538  
      
630  
      
723  
      
815  
      
908  
   
1,000  
 
 
Appendix A11
A.1.2.1. Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 40% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,493  
   
1,586  
   
1,679  
   
1,772  
   
1,865  
   
1,958  
   
2,051  
   
2,144  
   
2,237  
   
2,330  
1 
   
1,486  
   
1,579  
   
1,672  
   
1,765  
   
1,858  
   
1,951  
   
2,044  
   
2,137  
   
2,230  
   
2,323  
2 
   
1,479  
   
1,572  
   
1,665  
   
1,758  
   
1,851  
   
1,944  
   
2,037  
   
2,130  
   
2,223  
   
2,316  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,143  
   
1,236  
   
1,329  
   
1,422  
   
1,515  
   
1,608  
   
1,701  
   
1,794  
   
1,887  
   
1,980  
51 
   
1,136  
   
1,229  
   
1,322  
   
1,415  
   
1,508  
   
1,601  
   
1,694  
   
1,787  
   
1,880  
   
1,973  
52 
   
1,129  
   
1,222  
   
1,315  
   
1,408  
   
1,501  
   
1,594  
   
1,687  
   
1,780  
   
1,873  
   
1,966  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
793  
      
886  
      
979  
   
1,072  
   
1,165  
   
1,258  
   
1,351  
   
1,444  
   
1,537  
   
1,630  
101 
      
786  
      
879  
      
972  
   
1,065  
   
1,158  
   
1,251  
   
1,344  
   
1,437  
   
1,530  
   
1,623  
102 
      
779  
      
872  
      
965  
   
1,058  
   
1,151  
   
1,244  
   
1,337  
   
1,430  
   
1,523  
   
1,616  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
170  
      
263  
      
356  
      
449  
      
542  
      
635  
      
728  
      
821  
      
914  
   
1,007  
190 
      
163  
      
256  
      
349  
      
442  
      
535  
      
628  
      
721  
      
814  
      
907  
   
1,000  
 
Appendix A121
A.1.2.2. Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 60% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,692  
   
1,784  
   
1,876  
   
1,968  
   
2,060  
   
2,152  
   
2,244  
   
2,336  
   
2,428  
   
2,520  
1 
   
1,684  
   
1,776  
   
1,868  
   
1,960  
   
2,052  
   
2,144  
   
2,236  
   
2,328  
   
2,420  
   
2,512  
2 
   
1,676  
   
1,768  
   
1,860  
   
1,952  
   
2,044  
   
2,136  
   
2,228  
   
2,320  
   
2,412  
   
2,504  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,292  
   
1,384  
   
1,476  
   
1,568  
   
1,660  
   
1,752  
   
1,844  
   
1,936  
   
2,028  
   
2,120  
51 
   
1,284  
   
1,376  
   
1,468  
   
1,560  
   
1,652  
   
1,744  
   
1,836  
   
1,928  
   
2,020  
   
2,112  
52 
   
1,276  
   
1,368  
   
1,460  
   
1,552  
   
1,644  
   
1,736  
   
1,828  
   
1,920  
   
2,012  
   
2,104  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
892  
      
984  
   
1,076  
   
1,168  
   
1,260  
   
1,352  
   
1,444  
   
1,536  
   
1,628  
   
1,720  
101 
      
884  
      
976  
   
1,068  
   
1,160  
   
1,252  
   
1,344  
   
1,436  
   
1,528  
   
1,620  
   
1,712  
102 
      
876  
      
968  
   
1,060  
   
1,152  
   
1,244  
   
1,336  
   
1,428  
   
1,520  
   
1,612  
   
1,704  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
180  
      
272  
      
364  
      
456  
      
548  
      
640  
      
732  
      
824  
      
916  
   
1,008  
190 
      
172  
      
264  
      
356  
      
448  
      
540  
      
632  
      
724  
      
816  
      
908  
   
1,000  
 
Appendix A122
A.1.2.3. No Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 20% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,294  
   
1,388  
   
1,482  
   
1,576  
   
1,670  
   
1,764  
   
1,858  
   
1,952  
   
2,046  
   
2,140  
1 
   
1,288  
   
1,382  
   
1,476  
   
1,570  
   
1,664  
   
1,758  
   
1,852  
   
1,946  
   
2,040  
   
2,134  
2 
   
1,282  
   
1,376  
   
1,470  
   
1,564  
   
1,658  
   
1,752  
   
1,846  
   
1,940  
   
2,034  
   
2,128  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
      
994  
   
1,088  
   
1,182  
   
1,276  
   
1,370  
   
1,464  
   
1,558  
   
1,652  
   
1,746  
   
1,840  
51 
      
988  
   
1,082  
   
1,176  
   
1,270  
   
1,364  
   
1,458  
   
1,552  
   
1,646  
   
1,740  
   
1,834  
52 
      
982  
   
1,076  
   
1,170  
   
1,264  
   
1,358  
   
1,452  
   
1,546  
   
1,640  
   
1,734  
   
1,828  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
694  
      
788  
      
882  
      
976  
   
1,070  
   
1,164  
   
1,258  
   
1,352  
   
1,446  
   
1,540  
101 
      
688  
      
782  
      
876  
      
970  
   
1,064  
   
1,158  
   
1,252  
   
1,346  
   
1,440  
   
1,534  
102 
      
682  
      
776  
      
870  
      
964  
   
1,058  
   
1,152  
   
1,246  
   
1,340  
   
1,434  
   
1,528  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
160  
      
254  
      
348  
      
442  
      
536  
      
630  
      
724  
      
818  
      
912  
   
1,006  
190 
      
154  
      
248  
      
342  
      
436  
      
530  
      
624  
      
718  
      
812  
      
906  
   
1,000  
 
Appendix A123
A.2. Individual Decision Sheet (Baseline and Treatments): Rounds 1-10 
Rounds My nevel the extraction 
The level of 
extraction of them Score 
Practice 1       
Practice 2       
Practice 3       
1       
2       
3       ...       
10       
Total       
 
Appendix A2
B.1. Individual Score Table 
  My own amount of yield 
Aggregated amount 
of other participants 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4 758 790 818 840 858 870 878 880 
5 738 770 798 820 838 850 858 860 
6 718 750 778 800 818 830 838 840 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
10 638 670 698 720 738 750 758 760 
11 618 650 678 700 718 730 738 740 
12 598 630 658 680 698 710 718 720 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
20 438 470 498 520 538 550 558 560 
21 418 450 478 500 518 530 538 540 
22 398 430 458 480 498 510 518 520 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
30 238 270 298 320 338 350 358 360 
31 218 250 278 300 318 330 338 340 
32 198 230 258 280 298 310 318 320 
 
Appendix B1
B.2. Individual Decision Sheet - Baseline: Rounds 1-10 
Rounds 
A: Individual  
Amount of 
Yield 
B: Aggregated  
Amount of Yield 
of Group  
C (B-A): Aggregated 
Amount of Yield from 
other participants 
D: 
Score 
Practice 1         
Practice 2         
Practice 3         
1         
2         
3         ...         
10         
Total         
 
Appendix B2
B.3.1. Internal Regulation 
Rounds Vote for regulation* 
A: 
Individual  
Amount 
of Yield 
B: 
Aggregated 
Amount of 
Yield of 
Group 
C (B-A): 
Aggregated 
Amount of 
Yield from 
other 
participants 
D: 
Score 
E: 
Regulation 
Fine 
F (D-E): 
Final 
Score 
Fishing under 
unexpected 
conditions 
11 Y N             Y N 
12 Y N             Y N 
13 Y N             Y N 
...                     
20 Y N             Y N 
 
* The regulation applies only when the majority votes YES in the group; i.e. if there are at least 3 for YES votes, 
regulation is applied.   
 
Appendix B31
B.3.2. Random Regulation 
Round
s 
A: 
Individua
l  Amount 
of Yield 
B: 
Aggregate
d Amount 
of Yield of 
Group 
C (B-A): 
Aggegated 
Amount of 
Yield from 
other 
participant
s 
D: 
Score 
E: 
Regulatio
n Fine 
F (D-E): 
Final 
Score 
Fishing under 
unexpected 
conditions 
11             Y N 
12             Y N 
13             Y N ...                 
20             Y N 
 
Appendix B32
A.1.2.4. No Marine Reserve: Recovery Rate = 80% - Rounds 6-10 
    TABLE OF POINTS (PROFIT EXTRACTION + CONSERVATION) 
    My level of extraction 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f e
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 th
em
 
0 
   
1,891  
   
1,982  
   
2,073  
   
2,164  
   
2,255  
   
2,346  
   
2,437  
   
2,528  
   
2,619  
   
2,710  
1 
   
1,882  
   
1,973  
   
2,064  
   
2,155  
   
2,246  
   
2,337  
   
2,428  
   
2,519  
   
2,610  
   
2,701  
2 
   
1,873  
   
1,964  
   
2,055  
   
2,146  
   
2,237  
   
2,328  
   
2,419  
   
2,510  
   
2,601  
   
2,692  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
50 
   
1,441  
   
1,532  
   
1,623  
   
1,714  
   
1,805  
   
1,896  
   
1,987  
   
2,078  
   
2,169  
   
2,260  
51 
   
1,432  
   
1,523  
   
1,614  
   
1,705  
   
1,796  
   
1,887  
   
1,978  
   
2,069  
   
2,160  
   
2,251  
52 
   
1,423  
   
1,514  
   
1,605  
   
1,696  
   
1,787  
   
1,878  
   
1,969  
   
2,060  
   
2,151  
   
2,242  …
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…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
100 
      
991  
   
1,082  
   
1,173  
   
1,264  
   
1,355  
   
1,446  
   
1,537  
   
1,628  
   
1,719  
   
1,810  
101 
      
982  
   
1,073  
   
1,164  
   
1,255  
   
1,346  
   
1,437  
   
1,528  
   
1,619  
   
1,710  
   
1,801  
102 
      
973  
   
1,064  
   
1,155  
   
1,246  
   
1,337  
   
1,428  
   
1,519  
   
1,610  
   
1,701  
   
1,792  …
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
189 
      
190  
      
281  
      
372  
      
463  
      
554  
      
645  
      
736  
      
827  
      
918  
   
1,009  
190 
      
181  
      
272  
      
363  
      
454  
      
545  
      
636  
      
727  
      
818  
      
909  
   
1,000  
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